Likelihood and Consilience: On Forster's Counterexamples to

the Likelihood Theory of Evidence by Zhang, Jiji & Zhang, Kun
Likelihood and Consilience: On Forster’s Counterexamples to
the Likelihood Theory of Evidence
Jiji Zhang
Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University
Kun Zhang
Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems
Abstract
Forster presented some interesting examples having to do with distinguishing
the direction of causal influence between two variables, which he argued are coun-
terexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence (LTE). In this paper, we refute
Forster’s arguments by carefully examining one of the alleged counterexamples.
We argue that the example is not convincing as it relies on dubious intuitions that
likelihoodists have forcefully criticized. More importantly, we show that contrary to
Forster’s contention, the consilience-based methodology he favored is accountable
within the framework of the LTE.
1 Introduction
Forster (2006) presented some putative counterexamples to what he called a/the likeli-
hood theory of evidence (LTE):
“The Likelihood Theory of Evidence (LTE): The observed data are relevant
to the comparison of simple hypotheses (or models) only via the likelihoods
of the simple hypotheses being compared (or the likelihood functions of the
models under comparison).” (321)
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The LTE entails that if the likelihood of one hypothesis relative to a given body of data
— i.e., the probability of obtaining the data given the hypothesis — is the same as that
of another hypothesis, then the hypotheses cannot be distinguished based on the data
alone. Forster challenged this consequence with examples in which the data, he argued,
favor one hypothesis over another even though the two have the same likelihood.
For those concerned with causal inference, Forster’s examples are particularly interest-
ing because they have to do with distinguishing the direction of causal influence between
two random variables. Forster contended that his examples demonstrate a distinctive
methodology based on Whewell’s notion of “consilience of inductions” (Whewell 1858;
Forster 1988), which cannot be captured by a likelihoodist or Bayesian philosophy of
science that subscribes to the LTE.
Our purpose in this paper is twofold, one critical and one positive. First, in section
2, we argue that Forster’s challenge to the LTE is based on denying a basic, well-argued
thesis of likelihoodism. The thesis is that the evidential bearing of a body of data on a
given statistical hypothesis is essentially relative, depending on the alternative against
which the hypothesis is assessed. The apparent force of Forster’s counterexamples, we
argue, relies upon embracing an intuition that likelihoodists (e.g., Hacking 1965; Royall
1997; Sober 2008) have forcefully criticized — the intuition that a statistical hypothesis,
taken alone, can be rejected or shown to be false by data. At best, therefore, Forster’s
argument begs an important question against the likelihoodist.
Second, and more importantly, we aim to vindicate Forster’s preferred methodology
using likelihoods. We show in section 3 that there is a systematic connection between
likelihood and the kind of consilience Forster emphasized. Forster is right that consid-
erations of consilience are evidentially relevant. However, such relevance, we contend, is
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reflected in likelihoods.
Due to the space limit, we will focus on Forster’s example featuring discrete variables,
but our points extend straightforwardly to his example with continuous variables, as we
will briefly comment in section 4.
2 On Forster’s challenge to the LTE
For the likelihoodist, a thesis of fundamental importance is what Royall (1997) called
the “relativity of evidence”. A body of data constitutes evidence for or against a statis-
tical hypothesis only relative to some alternative hypothesis. For example, getting ten
heads straight in tossing a coin is not evidence against the coin being fair simpliciter. It
disconfirms the fair-coin hypothesis in reference to some alternative hypothesis, e.g., the
hypothesis that the coin is a trick coin with heads on both sides, or that the coin is so
biased towards one side that the chance of landing head in each flip is 0.9. But when
compared to certain other alternatives, e.g., the hypothesis that the coin is a trick coin
with tails on both sides, the observations favor the fair-coin hypothesis. The evidential
bearing of the data on the fair-coin hypothesis is thus relative to the alternative being
considered; evidential statements are essentially contrastive in form.
Detailed and compelling arguments for this view were elegantly presented by, among
others, Royall (1997, 65-68) and Sober (2008, 48-52), and we shall not repeat them
here. Suffice it to say that objections to the likelihood account of evidence that rely
on denying the relativity of evidence begs an important question. We will argue that
Forster’s challenge ends up question-begging in this way.
It is not obvious that Forster ran afoul of the relativity of evidence. His counterexam-
ples apparently pit a hypothesis against another. Here is the first version of the example
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we will focus on in this paper. Suppose that two variables X and Y are related by a
simple law: Y = X + U , where X is a variable taking positive integer values, and U
is an unobserved variable — error term — taking one of two values: 0.5 or -0.5, with
equal probability. Suppose also that data are generated by twenty independent trials,
with X = 4 in each trial. As it happens, in ten of the twenty trials, Y is observed to be
equal to 3.5 (i.e., the values of U in those trials are -0.5), and in the other ten trials, Y
is observed to be equal to 4.5 (i.e., the values of U in those trials are 0.5).
Let us use Xi, Yi, etc. to model the ith trial. Consider now two hypotheses. One is the
true hypothesis, which Forster referred to as Hypothesis A: Yi = Xi + Ui (i = 1, ..., 20),
and the error terms Ui’s are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) such that
P (Ui = −0.5) = P (Ui = 0.5) = 1/2.
The other hypothesis is referred to as Hypothesis B (for Backwards): Xi = Yi + Vi
(i = 1, ..., 20), and the error terms Vi’s are i.i.d. such that P (Vi = −0.5) = P (Vi = 0.5) =
1/2.1
In the first version of the example, Forster considered these two hypotheses as such,
and treated the exogenous variable in each hypothesis as non-random or given. Specifi-
cally, in A, Xi’s are not treated as random variables, but Yi’s are (because Ui’s are); in
B, Yi’s are not treated as random variables, but Xi’s are (because Vi’s are). For these
hypotheses, as Forster pointed out, only conditional likelihoods are well defined. For A,
the conditional likelihood is the probability of obtaining the observed values of Yi under
hypothesis A, given the values of Xi, which is (1/2)
20; for B, the conditional likelihood
is the probability of obtaining the observed values of Xi under hypothesis B, given the
1Forster used the same symbol U to denote the error terms in both hypotheses, which is potentially
misleading. To avoid confusions, we use V to denote the error term postulated by the backwards
hypothesis.
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values of Yi, which is also (1/2)
20.
According to Forster (2006),
“The example is already a counterexample to LTE in the following sense: We
are told that either A or B is true, and we can tell from the data that A is
true and B is false. But there is nothing in the likelihoods that distinguishes
between them.” (328, original emphasis)
We will return to Forster’s claim that one can tell from the data that A is true and B
is false. For now let us focus on a more basic problem with this version of the example.
The problem is that the two hypotheses concern different random variables: the random
variable in A is Y (or more accurately, 〈Y1, ..., Y20〉), and the random variable in B is X
(or 〈X1, ..., X20〉). However, a presupposition of LTE is that the hypotheses in question
concern a common set of random variables: the hypotheses imply probability distributions
over these variables, and the data are observations of their values. Royall, for example,
made it explicit in his influential formulation of the law of likelihood:
“If hypothesis A implies that the probability that a random variable X takes
the value x is pA(x), while hypothesis B implies that the probability is pB(x),
then the observation X = x is evidence supporting A over B if and only if
pA(x) > pB(x) ... .” (Royall 1997, 3)
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Clearly the present version of the example does not satisfy the presupposition. Thus, for
likelihoodists like Royall, it does not make sense to talk about the evidential support of
A versus B.
2Royall seemed to attribute this formulation to Hacking (1965), but as far as we can see, Hacking did
not formulate his law of likelihood in precisely these terms.
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To be fair, Forster was quick to acknowledge that a subscriber to LTE could eas-
ily respond to this version of the example by denying that LTE should apply to such
“incomplete” hypotheses. He put the subscriber’s complaint in the following terms:
“They might insist that the example violates the principle of total evidence
because the likelihoods are not relative to the full data, even though there are
no data “hidden from view”, or withheld in any way.” (Forster 2006, 328)
This, in our view, is a misdiagnosis on behalf of the the friends of LTE. The principle
of total evidence is about what evidence to take into account, but the LTE is about
the evidential bearing of given evidence on the comparison of hypotheses. It is perfectly
sensible to ask whether a certain part of the data supports one hypothesis against another
(though one should take total evidence into account, if possible, when updating beliefs
or judgements). In the present case, for example, there is no problem comparing, based
on conditional likelihoods, hypothesis A with, say, A∗: Yi = Xi + Ui, i = 1, ..., 20, and
P (Ui = −0.5) = 1/4 and P (Ui = 0.5) = 3/4. A and A∗ are as “incomplete” as A and
B are, but they are about the same random variables, and hence are comparable given
the data. By contrast, A and B as such are incomparable3 because they concern entirely
different random variables.
Why are hypotheses incomparable if they are about different random variables? This
is connected to the thesis of evidential relativity. To see the matter clearly, it helps to
consider a simpler case. Suppose two coins are each flipped independently for twenty
times. Of the first coin, all of the twenty flips turn up heads; of the second coin, half
of the flips turn up heads and half turn up tails. Consider two hypotheses: (1) the first
3By “incomparable” we mean only that the hypotheses are not subject to evidential comparison.
They may still be comparable in terms of rational credences or someone’s personal credences.
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coin is fair, and (2) the second coin is fair. The observations on the first coin — call
them D1 — are irrelevant to hypothesis (2) (in the absence of any background knowledge
or assumption linking the two coins). So it does not make sense to say that D1 provide
evidence for or against (1) versus (2). Similarly, we cannot say that D2, the data on the
second coin, provide evidence for or against (2) versus (1).
However, it may be tempting to think that the degree to which D2 support (2) is
greater than the degree to which D1 support (1). After all, it seems intuitive that (1)
fits D1 very poorly while (2) fits D2 rather well. If so, it would be fair to say that (1)
and (2) are comparable after all, given the combined data D = 〈D1, D2〉. But according
to the relativity of evidence, there is no such thing as the degree to which D2 support
(2) simpliciter or that to which D1 support (1) simpliciter. D1 confirm or disconfirm (1)
only in contrast to some other hypothesis concerning the outcomes of flipping coin 1, and
D2 confirm or disconfirm (2) only in contrast to some other hypothesis concerning the
outcomes of flipping coin 2. Hence, it does not make sense to say that D2 support (2)
better than D1 support (1).
Therefore, from the likelihoodist point of view, the basic problem with the present
‘counterexample’ is not so much a violation of the principle of total evidence as a jux-
taposition of incomparable hypotheses, and the incomparability is closely related to the
relativity of evidence. Forster’s neglect of this point signals his denial of the relativity of
evidence.
In any case, Forster did develop the example into one with comparable hypotheses.
Treat both X ′is and Y
′
i s as random variables. To A add the assumption that Xi and Ui
are statistically independent, and that P (Xi = xi) = 1, where xi is the observed value of
X on the ith trial. To B add the assumption that Yi and Vi are statistically independent,
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and that P (Yi = yi) = 1, where yi is the observed value of Y on the ith trial. That
is, the marginal distributions are specified in an ad hoc way to the effect that whatever
values the hypothesized exogenous variables actually take, the (constructed) hypotheses
entail that they take those values with probability 1. Such marginals are objectionable
and useless in practice for a number of reasons, but we will leave them aside. Following
Forster, call the resulting hypotheses A′ and B′. They have the same likelihood.4
L(A′) =
∏
i
PA′(Xi = xi, Yi = yi)
=
∏
i
PA′(Yi = yi|Xi = xi)PA′(Xi = xi) = (1/2)20
L(B′) =
∏
i
PB′(Xi = xi, Yi = yi)
=
∏
i
PB′(Xi = xi|Yi = yi)PB′(Yi = yi) = (1/2)20
According to Forster, this constitutes a counterexample to the LTE because despite the
equality of likelihoods, one can tell from the data that B′ is false and A′ is true. Here is
his argument. B′ entails that Vi and Yi are independent (for every i):
P (Vi = 0.5|Yi = 3.5) = P (Vi = 0.5|Yi = 4.5) = 1/2
or equivalently, P (Xi = 4|Yi = 3.5) = P (Xi = 5|Yi = 4.5) = 1/2. Call this consequence
B′1. However, from the data we see that the relative frequency of X = 4 in the trials in
which Y = 3.5 is 1, and the relative frequency of X = 5 in the trials in which Y = 4.5 is
0. Hence the data show that B′1 is false, and so B
′ is false.
Formulated this way, the argument is clearly not contrastive, and seems akin to the
probabilistic modus tollens that has been resolutely refuted by likelihoodists (Sober 2008,
51-53). It is not impossible, just very improbable, to obtain the data as they are even if
4Throughout the paper, we use upper case letters to denote variables and the corresponding lower
case letters to denote values of the variables.
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B′1 is true. A more charitable reading is that Forster did not literally mean that B
′
1 is
shown to be false, but that the data overwhelmingly disconfirm B′1 relative to Not-B
′
1.
However, Not-B′1 is a complex class of hypotheses. Relative to some members in the class,
the data are evidence against B′1, but relative to others, e.g. that P (Xi = 4|Yi = 3.5) =
0 6= P (Xi = 5|Yi = 4.5) = 1, the data are arguably evidence for B′1. In the absence of a
well-grounded prior over these members, it is hard to make sense of the sweeping claim
that the data seriously disconfirm B′-1 in favor of its logical negation.
Therefore, if we take the relativity of evidence seriously, the right way to state Forster’s
intuition is that the data provide evidence against B′-1 in reference to the given alternative
A′. More accurately, the data disconfirm B′1 relative to A
′
1: P (Xi = 4|Yi = 3.5) = 1 6=
P (Xi = 5|Yi = 4.5) = 0, which is entailed by A′. Indeed, the evidence against B′1 versus
A′1 is overwhelming, judging either intuitively or by a formal measure such as likelihood
ratio.
But the fact that the data constitute weighty evidence against B′1 versus A
′
1 does
not entail that the data are weighty evidence against B′ versus A′. A′1 and B
′
1 are
just parts of what A′ and B′ have to say about the data at hand; they are about the
conditional probability of Xi given Yi. But A
′ and B′ also have implications for the
marginal probability of Yi. A
′ entails A′2: P (Yi = 3.5) = P (Yi = 4.5) = 1/2 (for every i),
whereas B′ entails B′2: P (Yi = yi) = 1, where yi is the actual observed value of Yi. How
do the data bear on A′2 versus B
′
2?
Essentially the same question was addressed very early on in Royall (1997)’s elaborate
defense of likelihoodism. Shortly after he described the law of likelihood, he considered
and refuted a putative counterexample (13-15). Suppose an ordinary-looking deck of 52
cards is well-shuffled. We turn over the top card and find it to be the ace of diamonds.
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According to the law of likelihood, the observation supports the hypothesis that it is
a trick deck consisting of 52 aces of diamonds against the hypothesis that the deck is
ordinary. This may sound counterintuitive; intuitively the trick-deck hypothesis is not
rendered more probable or believable than the ordinary-deck hypothesis based on the
observation. But the evidential judgment is perfectly consistent with the intuition, for
the question of credence is different from that of evidence. Even though the observation
supports the trick-deck hypothesis against the ordinary-deck hypothesis, the former, in
ordinary circumstances, is much less credible prior to the observation and may well end
up less credible overall despite the positive evidence.
By the same token, for every trial in Forster’s example, the observation of Yi = yi
supports the hypothesis that P (Yi = yi) = 1 against the hypothesis that P (Yi = 3.5) =
P (Yi = 4.5) = 1/2, and overall the data favor B
′
2 over A
′
2. Again, this evidential judgment
should not be conflated with the judgment that the data render B′2 more credible than
A′2. In normal circumstances, there are a number of reasons to regard B
′
2 as much less
plausible than A′2, prior to considering the evidence, and the evidential support may well
be insufficient to overcome the initial implausibility.
The upshot is that the data are evidence for A′1 versus B
′
1, but also constitute evidence
against A′2 versus B
′
2. There is no compelling reason to think that the data alone favor
the conjunction of A′1 and A
′
2 over that of B
′
1 and B
′
2 (or the other way around). The
LTE, we conclude, is not threatened by the example.
3 Likelihood and consilience
Forster’s positive insight, however, is not to be ignored. As he put it, Hypothesis B′
suffers from a lack of “consilience”. Given B′, the probability distribution of the error
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term V can be measured or estimated under two conditions: when Y = 3.5 and when
Y = 4.5, but the two estimates do not “jump together”: the empirical distribution of V
estimated from the group of Y = 3.5 is very different from that of V estimated from the
group of Y = 4.5. In contrast, Hypothesis A′ does not have this problem (though in this
case it does not display interesting consilience due to the lack of variation in X). We
agree with Forster that this kind of consilience or lack thereof is evidentially significant,
but we submit that the contrast is reflected in the comparison of likelihoods.
To show this, it helps to consider yet another version of the example Forster discussed.
This version specifies the two hypotheses in the standard and perhaps most natural
way, which assumes that Xi’s and Yi’s are i.i.d. Under the i.i.d assumption, the best
fitting marginal of X is P (X = 4) = 1. Add this marginal of X, together with the
i.i.d assumption and that of the independence between X and U , to A, and call the
resulting hypothesis A′′. Similarly, the best fitting marginal of Y is P (Y = 3.5) = P (Y =
4.5) = 1/2. Add this marginal of Y , together with the i.i.d assumption and that of the
independence between Y and V , to B, and call the resulting hypothesis B′′. In this
example, A′′ happens to be the same as A′, so L(A′′) = (1/2)20. But B′′ is different from
B′, and has a much lower likelihood:
L(B′′) =
∏
i
PB′′(Xi = xi, Yi = yi)
=
∏
i
PB′′(Xi = xi|Yi = yi)PB′′(Yi = yi) = (1/2)40
The difference in likelihoods accords well with the intuition that the data favor A′′ over
B′′. But there is a “mystery” according to Forster. The likelihoods seem to differ just
because of the difference in the parts contributed by the added marginals, but why should
that matter? Intuitively, “the generation of the independent or exogenous variable [is]
an inessential part of the causal hypothesis.”
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We share the latter intuition. In particular, we are sympathetic with the view that a
defining feature of a causal relationship is that the relationship remains invariant under
suitable interventions of an exogenous cause that change its marginal distribution (Wood-
ward 2003). But it does not follow that marginals are irrelevant in causal inference. They
are especially relevant to the kind of problems under discussion: distinguishing the di-
rection of causal influence. In the present case, for example, X is hypothesized as the
cause in only one of the hypotheses; in the other hypothesis it is modeled as the effect.
The marginal distribution of X is relevant to judging, for example, how well the other
hypothesis, by treating X as endogenous, fits the observations on X, compared to the
former hypothesis that treats X as exogenous.
The right explanation in our view of the difference between the likelihoods actually
agrees nicely with Foster’s consideration of consilience. Notice that the lack of consilience
under B highlighted by Forster corresponds to the statistical dependence of V on Y as
shown in the data. A convenient measure of statistical dependence between random
variables is known as mutual information (Cover and Thomas 1991, 18). The mutual
information between two random variables Z and W is defined as:
I(Z,W ) = E log
P (Z,W )
P (Z)P (W )
= E(logP (Z,W )− logP (Z)− logP (W ))
where E(·) denotes the expectation (with respect to P (Z,W )). The mutual information is
a way to measure the difference between the joint distribution P (Z,W ) and the product
of the marginals P (Z)P (W ), and hence a way to measure the statistical dependence
between Z and W . It is non-negative and is equal to zero just in case Z and W are
independent.
Given i.i.d samples from the joint distribution P (Z,W ), we can use the following
sample approximation of the mutual information, by replacing the expectation with the
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sample mean, and P with the corresponding empirical distribution Pˆ (where probabilities
are estimated by sample frequencies):
Iˆ(Z,W ) =
1
n
∑
i
(log Pˆ (zi, wi)− log Pˆ (zi)− log Pˆ (wi))
where n is the sample size. This provides a measure of dependence as shown in the
samples. Accordingly, in Forster’s example, Iˆ(X,U) and Iˆ(Y, V ) can be regarded as
plausible measures of the lack of consilience in A′′ and B′′, respectively.
Some calculations are in order. Given the data in Forster’s example, the empirical
joint distribution of X and Y puts half of the mass on 〈X = 4, Y = 3.5〉 and half of
the mass on 〈X = 4, Y = 4.5〉. It follows that the empirical joint distribution of X
and U = Y − X puts half of the mass on 〈X = 4, U = −0.5〉 and half of the mass on
〈X = 4, U = 0.5〉; and the empirical joint distribution of Y and V = X − Y puts half of
the mass on 〈Y = 3.5, U = −0.5〉 and half of the mass on 〈Y = 4.5, U = 0.5〉. From these
it is easy to calculate, taking 2 as the base of the logarithm to simplify the numbers, that
Iˆ(X,U) = 0 and Iˆ(Y, V ) = 1. These, we repeat, are plausible measures of the lack of
consilience in Forster’s sense.
Consider now the log-likelihoods of A′′ and B′′, taking again 2 as the base of the
logarithm: l(A′′) = −20 and l(B′′) = −40. The difference between them per datum is
20/20 = 1, which is precisely the difference between Iˆ(Y, V ) and Iˆ(X,U).
This is not a numerical accident. The log-likelihood of A′′ can be written as:
l(A′′) =
∑
i
logPA′′(xi, yi) =
∑
i
logPA′′(xi, ui) =
∑
i
(logPA′′(xi) + logPA′′(ui))
Because for each i, 〈Xi = xi, Yi = yi〉 and 〈Xi = xi, Ui = ui = yi − xi〉 are descriptions of
the same event. Since the marginals in A′′ are specified as the corresponding empirical
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distributions — PA′′(X) = Pˆ (X) and PA′′(U) = Pˆ (U) — we have
l(A′′) =
∑
i
(log Pˆ (xi) + log Pˆ (ui))
=
∑
i
log Pˆ (xi, ui)−
∑
i
(log Pˆ (xi, ui)− log Pˆ (xi)− log Pˆ (ui))
=
∑
i
log Pˆ (xi, ui)− nIˆ(X,U)
Similarly,
l(B′′) =
∑
i
log Pˆ (yi, vi)− nIˆ(Y, V )
Note further that for every i, Pˆ (xi, ui) = Pˆ (yi, vi) = Pˆ (xi, yi). Hence,
l(A′′)− l(B′′) = n(Iˆ(Y, V )− Iˆ(X,U))
Therefore, there is here a systematic connection between the comparison of likelihoods
and the comparison of how hypotheses fare in terms of “consilience of inductions” high-
lighted by Forster. The evidential significance of consilience, or at least one plausible
interpretation of it, is not beyond the grip of the LTE.
4 Conclusion
Whether or not the LTE can survive other challenges, Forster’s examples, we conclude,
are not convincing counterexamples. We have only examined one of his examples in this
paper, but the other example, set up in linear models with continuous variables, employs
parallel devices and arguments, to which our points in section 2, mutatis mutandis, carry
over. The apparent force of his examples hinges on an (implicit) denial of the basic tenet
of likelihoodism, i.e., the thesis of the relativity of evidence. Since the denial is based on
no argument but dubious intuitions that have been forcefully criticized by likelihoodists,
Forster’s criticism is at best question begging.
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More interestingly, we showed a way to vindicate Forster’s preferred consilience-based
methodology within the framework of the LTE, by establishing a systematic connection
between likelihood and (one plausible interpretation of) consilience. The connection holds
much more generally for such causal models than we can show in this paper (Hyva¨rinen
and Smith 2013; Zhang et al. forthcoming). In particular, Hyva¨rinen and Smith (2013,
115) presented a similar result on linear models, which is applicable to Forster’s example
with continuous variables. Whether similar connections exist in contexts other than this
sort of causal inference problems is worth exploring.
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